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This article takes up John Forrester’s account of the psychoanalytic case (1996, 2017) 
– not in its development as a professional tool for gaining empirical knowledge about 
individuals, but as it gets reworked across the twentieth century, often outside the 
psychoanalytic clinic, as an inquiry into the social and historical enmeshing of 
subjectivity. Italian feminist and oral historian Luisa Passerini’s study Autobiography 
of a Generation: Italy, 1968 (1996[1988]) will serve here as an illustration of such a 
hybrid attempt to intervene methodologically from ‘inside’ the case in order to forge a 
space for ‘subjectivity’ within history – which, I will argue, is a slightly different 
project from Forrester’s concern with a ‘science of the individual’ (1996: 9). While 
invoking some of the features of a clinical psychoanalytic account – particularly by 
incorporating an account of her own analysis – her book also re-inflects this model to 
depart radically from what we know about case-histories. In part this is because 
psychoanalysis is being combined with forms of historical and social enquiry. Here 
Passerini was not alone – Ronald Fraser’s In Search of a Past (1984) and Carolyn 
Steedman’s Landscape for a Good Woman (1986) are examples from the same period 
of further hybrids between historical investigation and psychoanalytic case histories. 
But the formal departure under discussion here has also to do with the radical nature 
of the design which, by drawing on various narrative, reflective and analytical tools 
pioneered by Sigmund Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), reworks the 
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disciplinary framing of social and historical phenomena. Part log-book from a 
psychoanalysis, part autobiography, part historical account of the experience of 1968 
in Italy (thus potentially three forms of case study), Passerini’s work subverts the 
models designed to contain it. It has been described as both ‘non-ordinary’ history 
(Pető, 2012: 376) and an ‘experimental autobiography’ which breaks all the basic 
topoi of that genre (Pravadelli, 2012: 372). 
 
Some notion of this tendency – some interest in changing the rules of the game – can 
already be derived from Forrester’s genealogical work on cases. Although Forrester 
states that the original impetus for his own ‘thinking in cases’ came from the 
psychoanalytic case history (1996: 1-2; 2017: 127), as important was his long-term 
engagement with Michel Foucault. One of his earliest published papers was ‘Michel 
Foucault and the History of Psychoanalysis’ (1980), and he remained in debate with 
Foucault throughout the next few decades (Forrester, 1985, 1997, 2014). The project, 
then, was not just about the constitution of knowledge from cases, or how they arose 
as a style of reasoning, but also about how cases come to intervene in the historical 
constitution of individuals, and of subjectivity per se. In 1996, in ‘If p, then what? 
Thinking in cases’, Forrester turned in particular to Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 
1977) and its description of emerging professional cultures in the nineteenth century 
through which individuals are described, judged, measured, and also normalized. For 
Foucault such forms of examination turn each individual into a ‘case’ – and by 
implication psychoanalysis was to be included in the critique of such technologies. 
What intrigued Forrester was the possibility that, contra Foucault, the genre of the 
case might afford more disrupted, more tentative or singular versions of how one 
arrives at knowledge of people and their situations: ‘What many find most seductive 
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in psychoanalysis’ he writes, ‘is its promise to give an account of the divergences, the 
detours, the idiosyncrasies of the individual’s life’ (Forrester, 1996: 10); 
psychoanalysis promises to reveal life, ‘in its singularity and distinctiveness’ (ibid.: 
10). This point about particularity is explored by Julie Walsh in the current issue 
(2019). According to Walsh, the psychoanalyst ‘follows the ethnographer in her 
commitment to thick description’ (2019: ??); the logic of the case study ‘is designed 
to give space to the many and often contrary lines of study that emerge from within 
the patient-analyst experience’ (ibid.: ??). 
 
‘If p, then what? Thinking in cases’ was concerned with establishing the wide-angled 
view of this: Forrester traces possible roots for the modern case history from Greek 
medicine and medieval Christian casuistry to the case-method approach to teaching in 
the Harvard Law School of the 1870s. In a virtuosic way he touches on the birth of 
statistics, Darwinian natural history, and J.S. Mill’s attack on logic, in an attempt to 
position the case history as a new vehicle in the history of knowledge – one that 
becomes central to the transmission of psychoanalysis as a science. But, for Forrester, 
there is another way of thinking about psychoanalysis and cases, which approaches 
them not in terms of professional practice, but from the perspective of the individual 
for whom the case history provides a ‘new way of telling a life’ (1996: 10). This 
alternative view might root itself in the example of Freud’s self-analysis and The 
Interpretation of Dreams which emerged from it. As Forrester put it, ‘Each dream 
unveils a little more of that singular version of an autobiography that we find in that 
book’ (ibid.: 10).  
 
Impossible Cases 
4 
 
The questions I’ll be pursuing here concern the transformations that the 
psychoanalytic case introduced into the construction of individuality going forward: 
not only into models of the psychotherapeutic case history, but also into Edwardian 
and modernist autobiography and historical accounts of personal life. Freud 
developed a set of practical clinical techniques – including the analytic encounter, the 
couch, the encouragement of transference, the recollection of childhood, and the 
probing of sexual desire – which were designed to render visible a narrative of 
subjective life in its most intimate details. As such, psychoanalytic case histories 
become comparable to other genres of self-narration, such as the autobiographical 
writings of Rousseau, De Quincey, and others, who equally developed new ways of 
chronicling self-experience and took an interest in the elusive relation between the 
infant and the adult, in memories, fantasies and the unconscious (see Böhmer, this 
issue, for a discussion of how cases can be read in a wider cultural context which 
includes their circulation in literary networks). 
 
What I want to pursue here is something different, which is the emergence of new 
kinds of autobiographical work – informed by psychoanalysis – with radical, 
experimental or critical dimensions, which end up dismantling the boundaries of the 
conventional life, and the conventional case, without necessarily putting anything 
solid in its place. I see this genre emerging in part out of interactions between the 
psychoanalytic case history and the cultural project of modernism. I have in mind 
texts such as Walter Benjamin’s memory work in Berlin Childhood (2006) and the 
Arcades Project (1999); H.D.s A Tribute to Freud (2012) or her later psychological 
account Magic Mirror (2012); Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin White Masks (1986) – 
which contains a great deal of autobiographical detail and self-analysis, and includes 
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psychoanalytic theorisation as well as excerpts from case histories. Wilfred Bion’s A 
Memoir of the Future (1991), and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Dialogue on Love 
(1999) and more recently Julia Kristeva’s Teresa my Love (2014) provide further 
examples, as do psychoanalyst Marion Milner’s early self-analytical exercises and 
C.G. Jung’s Memories, Dreams, Reflections. Some of these texts have been important 
to Passerini’s own work – she cites Benjamin in both Autobiography and Memory and 
Utopia (2007), and, in this latter work, she suggests Bion’s memoir as a model for 
how to think the limits of disciplines such as history in the light of ‘memory’s fragile 
power’ (2007: 30). She ‘devoured’ H.D. in the late 1960s (2012: 305), and 
Autobiography recalls how Fanon is summoned during a séance in the early 1970s 
and questioned about the date of the coming revolution (1996: 110). This doesn’t 
mean Passerini was explicitly drawing her model from such authors, but her hybrid 
model for a case certainly has structural affinities with theirs. 
 
One could refer to all these texts as ‘exploding’ or ‘impossible’ cases because they 
challenge our idea of what the self is, and how an account of its life might be framed 
methodologically (Passerini described her own topic of 1968 as ‘the explosion of 
subjectivity’ [2007: 56]). These works redraw conventional maps of lived experience, 
while still attempting to objectify it in some way, to put it into public circulation as a 
model of how subjectivity works. I’m taking the model of a ‘case’ here to imply a 
formal arena of professional or scientific jurisdiction, within which an investigator 
mobilises a case, or assembles cases, to explore or explain a specific point: to 
determine something, as an example for others who share similar disciplinary or 
professional commitments. I’m therefore assuming, at the very least, an element of 
instrumentality in the psychoanalytic case (however much this may be hedged round 
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rhetorically with uncertainty or digression). Freud described his Dora case as 
incomplete and ‘imperfectly elucidated’ (1905: 12), yet he expected it to 
‘substantiate’ the views he put forward in 1895-6 upon ‘the pathogenesis of hysterical 
symptoms’. 
 
Cases also sustain the illusion that there is a standpoint from which one can look at an 
individual subject, or an element of subjectivity, in a relatively isolated way – isolated 
from the broader social and historical context. But these alternative forms of quasi-
psychoanalytic self-investigation I’m putting forward disrupt that model, and 
introduce large swathes of structural indeterminacy, in a number of ways. Firstly, 
they’re autobiographical, or contain components of autobiography, so the role of the 
investigator and the role of the individual are collapsed. Second, and in part because 
of this, the narrative structures of these texts are often dominated to a far greater 
extent than are psychoanalytic ones by the free associative leaps of their authors, and 
by tones of hesitancy, loss, crisis, or rapture. The relations between subjectivity and 
psychoanalysis are effectively turned inside-out – so that subjective narrative provide 
the frame for psychoanalysis, and not the other way round. Finally, and most 
significantly, these ‘impossible’ cases are being used to generate questions not just 
about an individual subject, but about broader conditions for subjectivity in history 
and society, and how these objects of study interpenetrate. They explode the more 
sociologically limited arena of any professional use of case-work and replace it with a 
much more complex and extensive engagement with human history. Everything that 
used to be outside the case is now inside. Some of the broader contexts invoked in the 
texts I’ve mentioned include the legacy of colonialism (for Fanon); capitalist 
modernity (for Benjamin); the history of civilization and religion (for H.D.); or the 
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historical emergence of the Baroque as a turning point for the representation of the 
sensuous body (for Kristeva). 
 
The questions thus raised are so far-reaching and radically posed that they dwarf the 
notion of the psychoanalyst-analysand relationship; but this makes it all the more 
interesting that the latter is retained, in varying degrees, as a useful stand-point by the 
authors in question. All of them, in their very different approach to representing the 
composition of a life, make ample use of the new sources of self-knowledge which 
became privileged sites for psychoanalytic self-exploration: the unconscious, the 
irrational, free association, the sexual, the dream, childhood, the repressed. One 
question to be asked, then, is: how is the psychoanalysis functioning? What does it 
become in these texts? And what are they, any more, cases of? 
 
I want to leave open the question as to whether psychoanalysis inexorably leads these 
writers in this broader direction. Or, alternatively, whether it’s something in the 
authors, and their decision to engage issues of social and historical consciousness, that 
is giving their narratives their radical shape, with psychoanalysis providing a set of 
useful tools with which to mediate the complex unsettled fragments of their enquiries. 
Freud arguably already provided a model for the interpenetration of the micro-
histories of cases with the very broad social and historical scale of civilization when 
he moved into the terrain of anthropology, the analysis of groups, and the history of 
culture and religion. Moses and Monotheism (1939) is a grand composite of all the 
socio-historical frames which Freud engages beyond the clinic, while still setting 
them within the putative mould of a case history. But Freud’s history of human 
society also tended to be the Oedipus complex writ large – according to Forrester, the 
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central ‘exemplar’ for psychoanalysis (1996: 10). All the texts I’ve put forward pretty 
much divest themselves of that particular structural model. In fact all the writers I’ve 
suggested as examples of this hybrid type of case appear bereft of foundational 
structures and explanations. They give us incomplete, anxious, and unreassured 
accounts of the whole within which they are trying to situate human subjectivity.  
 
One reason for this is their experience of war – the projects of Bion, H.D., Fanon, 
Milner and Benjamin all have a particular concrete relation to war and its traumas. 
But another is that psychoanalysis has also appealed to writers for whom the forms of 
provisionality and instability that Freud introduced into the model of the mind – in 
comparison with other psychologies of rational consciousness – provide a different 
kind of fulcrum through which to try and understand the interconnectedness of 
communities and subjects. Psychoanalysis introduces an interest in dimensions of 
mental life which subvert the notion of a consciously told narrative about the self and 
replaces this with the unconscious life of consciousness. The post-Freudian ego never 
entirely regains control of its own autobiography. This much might be shared with 
other late-Victorian psychologies of the unconscious, such as that of Pierre Janet or 
Frederic Myers. What psychoanalysis brought in addition was new practices through 
which to read dreams, mental associations, jokes or infancy, which further 
destabilised narrative expectations and moral or intellectual demands for coherence. 
Not only did Freud unhinge the way we think about consciousness, he unhinged the 
ways in which people thought about the unconscious – this was a radical step he took. 
Freud supplied new intimations about the way mind, body, lived emotional history 
and external events are connected through forms of instability and disconnection. 
Perhaps none of the texts I’ve mentioned would be written in quite the same way 
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without the example of The Interpretation of Dreams. This interest in dis-junction 
also explains the alliances literary modernism forges with Freud. Many of the texts 
I’ve cited draw directly from modernist techniques – particularly in their use of 
montage and abrupt shifts of tone (Bion was informed by readings of Joyce and 
Pound; Benjamin by surrealism; Fanon by Aimé Césaire and Éduard Glissant; H.D. 
by imagism; Kristeva by Tel Quel).  
 
Autobiography of a Generation 
This is a good stepping off point for engaging with Luisa Passerini’s Autobiography 
of a Generation as an example of some of the features I’ve outlined above – most 
obviously in its combination of autobiography and psychoanalysis with a wider set of 
historical investigations, but also for the way it engages the case history while also 
methodologically unhinging it. It is itself an exercise in montage, presided over by an 
epigraph from Raymond Queneau’s Pierrot mon amour on the instability and 
deceptiveness of the past. There will not be space here to track its complex narrative 
in a huge amount of detail or to assess it as a work of history – though I will try and 
give a sense of how the text dislocates itself from conventional historical practice. 
What concerns me more overall (with a glance back to Forrester’s debate with 
Foucault over the transmission of cases and the production of subjectivity) are the 
ways in which the text amplifies the notion that the psychoanalytic case history 
contains the seeds of its own undoing. This is because the concepts of the psyche, and 
the nature of mental histories which come out of psychoanalysis, are typically ones 
which dissolve a sense both of the boundaries of the person (a trend already initiated 
in Freud’s Group Psychology) and of history as a narrative that can be sequentially 
ordered (already apparent in the complexity Freud introduced into accounts of 
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memory through the concepts of the unconscious, screen memories, and 
Nachträglichkeit). As Michel de Certeau observed: psychoanalytic biography affirms 
‘an erosion of its own postulates. Working from within, it dismantles… the historical 
and social figure that is the standard unit of the system within which Freudianism was 
developed’ (1986: 15; I wish to thank Thomas Kugler for alerting me to this passage). 
 
A crisis somewhat along these lines – at least involving the dissolution of the 
conventional framing of historical and social identity – inaugurates the unfolding of 
Passerini’s multiple narratives. There are in effect three explicit threads to this book. 
One comprises excerpts from oral history interviews for a collaborative project 
mapping trans-European dimensions of the experience of 1968. These fed into a 
collective study, A Student Generation in Revolt, edited by Ronald Fraser and 
published in time for the twenty-year anniversary in 1988, as was Autobiography 
itself. The second component is a set of autobiographical reflections drawing on 
Passerini’s own diaries from 1984-87, but also collaging inserts from interviews about 
her life, along with other recollections published in Italian venues in the mid-1970s. 
The oral history sections (contained in the three even-numbered chapters of the book) 
consist of interviews with leaders of the student movement from the Humanities 
faculty at the University of Turin, and reflect back on 1968 and its legacy, tracked 
through moments of disillusion and reinvention up to the late 1970s. But the 
transcripts begin with the interviewees’ recollections of childhood in the 1950s, as 
one of the commonalities for that generation was the legacy of fascism (Passerini’s 
previous study had been on Fascism in Popular Memory [1987], examining the Turin 
working class in the 1920s and 1930s.). Thus in terms of temporalities, it’s a very 
complex work (Lisa Baraitser devotes an excellent chapter to this aspect of Passerini’s 
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book as well as its clinical dimensions in Enduring Time [2017]). The third narrative 
strand is the specifically psychoanalytic one which, in a similar way to Sedwick in A 
Dialogue on Love, reports and reflects on moments in her analysis with Dr. G. The 
analysis, which commenced in the Spring of 1984, ranges freely over the present and 
the past, trying to locate something that’s missing, which has left Passerini feeling 
bereft at this point of her life. The work as a whole is very much a narrative of 
inexplicable feelings of loss or absence. 
 
One aspect of this absence is a methodology or structure through which the different 
elements of the book could be made to cohere (and which might turn the account into 
a case of something in particular). This makes it a hard book to summarise – at the 
very least, it is not a straightforward history of 1968 in Italy; that more conventional 
processing of the material into a chronological narrative can be found in Passerini’s 
contributions to the collaborative 1968 book, in relation to which Autobiography is a 
form of fall-out. The uncertainty as to its form, purpose, and subject matter is to a 
certain extent caused by a series of practical and methodological crises which govern 
the book’s inception and appear to provide its initial impetus. One is Passerini’s 
dawning recognition that the international oral history project won’t come together, or 
not in the way originally envisaged, and that therefore she ‘will have to work alone on 
memory, and perhaps not for the purpose of producing a history’ (1996[1988]: 21). 
This shift in part establishes her move across the boundary from historical work to 
psychoanalysis, though the boundaries of genre remain unsettled here (in a later 
commentary Passerini judges Autobiography not to be a work of history because it 
doesn’t footnote references to sources, ‘a prerogative of history’s epistemological 
status’ [2012: 317]).  
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A further ‘shock’ to disciplinary norms – and to the case history form – comes 
through a process of mirroring in which Passerini recognises aspects of her own life in 
those of her interviewees, who like herself grew up in the aftermath of Mussolini’s 
Italy and belonged to radical student communities in the late 1960s. The first chapter 
of the book is called ‘Mirrors’ (with perhaps also a nod to Lacan’s theory of the 
formation of the ego in the ‘mirror-stage’). Of one interviewee she writes, ‘In his 
story I observe some of my own experiences; in his gestures I recognize some of my 
passions’ (1996[1988]: 2). Rather than conveying reassurance, this doubling 
uncomfortably collapses the methodological boundary between the investigator and 
the investigated. The book thus opens with a personal drama: ‘I conducted my first 
interviews with the protagonists of 1968. The interviews plunge me into my own past: 
as I listen, the film of what I was doing at the time unreels. Memory redoubled in this 
way is hard to bear’ (ibid.: 1). The excavation of recent Italian history involves her in 
the demythologisation of her own childhood, creating a short-circuit between history 
and autobiography. Is this a work of meta-history? An act of self-recollection? Or a 
deconstruction of the forms of memory – oral history presenting the missing 
supplement to mainstream historical scholarship, while psychoanalysis in addition 
presents that which eludes the conscious testimony of the person? These are questions 
which fluctuate around the montage of interviews with the protagonists of 1968 
themselves, which are organised more legibly around three major themes: ‘Choosing 
to be Orphans’ (covering the later 1940s to early 1960s); the explosion of 1968 itself; 
and the 1970s, under the rubric of ‘Paths of Individuation’. 
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But there’s a third crisis – professional and methodological – which is that Passerini 
finds the transcripts from the interviews are themselves unusable: ‘They reproduce 
neither my own emotion at seeing myself in the mirror nor that of the other person at 
recounting his or her own experience as a whole for the first time. Those who get the 
transcripts react with disappointment, irritation, rejection’ (ibid.: 2). The personal and 
the social throughout the book act as metonyms for each other. Passerini enters 
psychoanalysis at this same point in order to deal with a mid-life crisis – anxiety 
attacks, a sense of rootlessness, and emotional incapacity: she is attracted to men who 
are never there for her, ‘Mirror of my own not being there’ (ibid.: 46). But that 
generation as a whole was founded on the experience of estrangement, and the need 
for emancipation from constricting familial and authoritarian social structures: ‘At the 
roots of our memory, in dozens of life histories, I find a rupture’, opens the first oral 
history chapter (ibid.: 22). Thus a complex, circular relation is set up between 
Passerini’s attempt to work through emotional blockages in her own identity, and to 
locate a sense of rupture at the heart of the 1960s and 1970s. If self-recollection 
justifies her own insertion into the narrative of the student rebellion as it broadened to 
engage the plight of migrant workers in the Fiat factory – ‘In May 1969 I found 
myself, without any specific political affiliation, in front of Mirafiori, along with 
many others, handing out leaflets’ (ibid.: 102) – so her statement to her psychoanalyst 
–  ‘I have no memory of any origins that resemble me’ (ibid.: 4) – equally speaks to 
the existential unease of those dislocated from the world into which they were born. 
 
The Case of Subjectivity 
That much concerns the intertwining of Passerini’s personal ‘case’ with the historical 
one. But there is a further ‘doubling’ going on which has to do with the way in which 
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Passerini professionally orients her work precisely around an attempt to give a history 
of subjectivity. Here the psychoanalysis makes itself felt not just as a technique of 
self-investigation, but also as a disciplinary tool. ‘The main contribution of 
psychoanalysis to historical studies’, in her view, ‘has been to make subjectivity – 
including its unconscious dimensions and internal fissures – into an object of history’ 
(2012: 309). Already in Passerini’s earlier study of the cultural experience of the 
Turin working class (1987), her interest in fantasies and jokes (mobilising Freud with 
Bakhtin) was designed to render more everyday, elusive and unconscious aspects of 
subjectivity materially present for the historian. ‘It is an irony of history’, she argues 
there, ‘that what is written about it so largely ignores the personal lives of individuals 
in the very period (the past hundred years) when individual subjectivity has been 
transformed, becoming an important area of scientific study and political interest’ 
(Passerini, 1987: 3). It is, then, as an episode in the history of subjectivity that the 
student movements engage her attention in the mid-1980s. Indeed, what differentiated 
the Turin movement from that in Rome was the former’s emphasis specifically on 
self-creation. As one of the student leaders, Guido Viale, clarifies (in Passerini’s 
contribution to the Fraser book, rather than in Autobiography): ‘Here were those who 
had been silenced discovering themselves as the protagonists of their own lives, 
expressing their needs in a new language’ (Fraser, ed., 1988: 253). By the time 
Passerini publishes Memory and Utopia, in 2007, she will situate 1968 very broadly 
indeed in terms of epochal changes in train since the 11th century (2007: 55). Within 
the 1988 book, there’s a more local narrative to tell about the shift from family and 
community life of the 1950s towards this sudden irruption of new and radical forms of 
experience.  
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The value Passerini ascribes to subjectivity makes it a hinge-point between the book 
as (1) a work of critical history; (2) a form of personal recollection; and (3) a ‘case’, 
which is searching for the lineaments of ‘something’ formal to be transmitted from 
the event of 1968, but which is proving elusive. The material is both held in the quasi-
form of a case, and is everywhere deflected from being given a solid, formal 
articulation. I will briefly sketch some different gestures the book performs around 
this failed materialisation of ‘subjectivity’ in each of these modes. First (as history) 
the thematic movement across the chapters of interviews sketches different social 
phases of self-discovery. 1968 heralded ‘the establishment of new fusionist 
communities’. Looking back, Laura Derossi, one of the student leaders, complains: ‘I 
didn’t have an individual life, I no longer did anything by myself...’ (1996[1988]: 89); 
Luigi Bobbio (another Turin leader and Derossi’s fiancé at the time) recalls the 
assumption that ‘the public is the expression of my subjectivity, it is my way of being 
myself’ (ibid.: 89). This period is followed by the fragmentation of the larger group 
into the myriad organisations of the New Left, and during and after this the 
conversion of that original fervour into periods of isolation and individual crises 
during which ‘individuals are moulded who did not exist before’ (ibid.: 149). 
Passerini refers to this overall arc as a ‘subjective upturn’ (ibid.: 23). The account 
provides an interesting analogy to the origin of the book itself (the splitting off of a 
personal memoir from a group project), and Passerini’s turn to investigate her own 
subjectivity can be envisaged as itself a product of that historical turn: ‘For this 
generation what we might call the right of autobiography – to give a sense, or more 
than one sense, to its own past… assumes a particular meaningfulness’ (ibid.: 154).  
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However, there’s something about the move from the collective to individual 
subjectivity, as well as the series of ruptures and crises implicated in that transition, 
which at the same time undermines the exposition of that first narrative in which 
subjectivity is something positively materialised in history. It is here that the more 
fluid, intuitive mode of recollection accomplishes a subtle form of work – this would 
be the second ‘gesture’ (memoir). On the one hand, the shift to more inward-facing 
work on personal identity and the politics of desire acts as an example of what it 
means to become a ‘subject’. But the modes of melancholy, despair and crisis 
encountered in her self-reflections allow her to recast that same historical trajectory as 
a loss – a loss that is often disowned or covered up in the retrospection and self-
justifications of her interviewees (hence, perhaps, everyone’s disappointment and 
irritation with the transcripts). From this perspective, the eruptive power of the 
university occupations of 1967 and the major strike of 1969 is dissipated (the student 
leadership diminishing as the struggle broadens to other sections of Italian society) 
and ultimately rechannelled – into more conventional political alliances (the trades 
unions, the Communist Party); for a segment of the younger generation of activists 
into the bleak terrorism of the 1970s; for many, back into the working world, where 
they now find themselves as experts in media and communications. Recollections of 
the time are ‘laden with uneasiness’ (ibid.: 126); against this backdrop ‘stands the 
shadow of a defeat, without the clarity of what exactly has been lost and who has 
won’ (ibid.: 126). It is this mode of mourning, uncertainty, and ‘not knowing’ on the 
part of the author which perhaps could not be incorporated into the more ‘official’ and 
factual account in the collaborative study. 
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But this touches on a broader methodological issue which is: what does it mean to 
give a history of subjectivity? And here is the third ‘gesture’ through which the case 
of subjectivity is both invoked and radically problematized. The ‘idea of combining 
memory and historiography’ (ibid.: 121), while showing affinities with the trajectory 
of 1968 in Italy itself, also presents a crisis of historical method, which as yet had no 
formal place for the kinds of ‘subjectivity’ Passerini is making her object of enquiry. 
In the earlier case study of Turin under fascism (Passerini, 1987), the memories of 
working-class protagonists were read by assimilating them to the more mythic and 
symbolic forms encoded in folk tales and oral culture. The method of interpretation in 
Autobiography is harder to pin down, and not just because the subjective sense of 
these middle-class participants remains a more open-ended and elusive affair. It is 
also because of the way in which the autobiographical and semi-psychoanalytic drama 
woven around the interviews disarticulates the narrative, and displaces a historical 
vantage point with uprootedness and a painful, confused doubling-back. Where one 
expects the governing perspective of the historian – the ‘expert’ of the case – is only a 
disconsolate subject, who cannot find her beginning or end, and is in despair. What 
Passerini does with the case here – by including herself in the case – has radical 
implications for the methodology. The composite nature of the book, which she 
assembled in a white heat across the summer months of 1987, produces a certain kind 
of intuitive, dream-like solution, to the problem of form. But from which point in this 
hall of mirrors is the subject and subjectivity counted as being rendered visible? Only 
in its occlusions? Was the potential of subjectivity, inaugurated in 1968, simply lost 
again through historical change? Or is it lost in the telling? 
 
Methodology in a Subjunctive Mode 
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Here it finally becomes clearer how the psychoanalysis might function – or what 
might be riding on it. One might presume it is psychoanalysis that can reach into the 
broken and stuttering narratives of the subject in order to retrieve its history. Isn’t this 
what psychoanalysis classically does? And yet, Passerini’s solicitation of 
psychoanalytic modes of enquiry seems purposefully to disrupt the sense of a specific 
clinical or interpretive logic. She chooses an analyst who is Jungian, but influenced by 
Freud and Lacan (2012: 312); her text recalls the impact of Wilhelm Reich on the 
generation of 1968 – ‘We were convinced that orgasm combatted the repression of 
bourgeois society’ (1996[1988]: 43) – and the guiding influence of Milanese 
psychoanalyst Elvio Fachinelli, important in disseminating Lacanian ideas to Italian 
students (she attended his groups in the early 1970s). Psychoanalysis is something 
that more loosely imbues the text, and the history, and indicates zones into which an 
account of subjectivity (personal or historical) might be pursued. But it is not that 
which wraps the individual subject up as an object for the historian. Instead, it is that 
which helps Passerini to suspend knowledge of the subject (recalling Forrester’s 
critique of Foucault, again). One factor informing this decision not to arrive at a clear 
view of the ‘subject’ is that it is simply too early to see what this subjectivity is, or 
became, or is still in the process of becoming. As in fact the Fraser book also suggests 
in its closing statements: ‘The historical significance of past events can be fully 
appreciated only when their contribution to shaping the future becomes clear. The 
present – only two decades on from 1968 – is not yet that future’ (1988: 353). 
Passerini’s book in many ways situates itself within this lapse, where knowledge of 
1968 is strangely suspended, while making clear the pathos of occupying this hiatus in 
historical judgement, and in self-knowledge.  
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In the Fraser book, that suspension of judgment is really a qualification introduced 
into the books concluding remarks, but it provides the very terrain of Autobiography 
right from the start. It is also something very much engineered precisely through the 
post-Freudian evocation of subjectivity as something inherently conditioned by 
Nachträglichkeit, by ambivalence, by forms of forgetting and by that which remains 
unconscious. Passerini recalls of her own professional ‘turn’ in the late 1970s: 
‘Having decided to bring subjectivity into history, I had no doubt that this had to 
include the unconscious, although it was not clear exactly what this meant’ (2012: 
308). One can argue, then, for a different way of approaching the contribution of 
psychoanalysis to the case. It is not just that the unconscious acts as a cipher for 
Forrester’s quarry, the enigmatic particularity of the individual – ‘the specific and 
unique facts that make that person’s life their life’; ‘the deafening silence that 
constitutes that life’s secret truths’ (1996: 10). The unconscious can also be ‘writ 
large’ into the fabric of interdisciplinary enquiry, thus allowing methodology, and the 
framework of enquiry per se, to be pitched as incomplete and provisional, the objects 
and their linkages still awaiting discovery. 
 
Something like this notion of psychoanalysis as a disrupter of ‘the case’ was already 
broached in the quotation from De Certeau quoted earlier: ‘working from within, it 
dismantles… the historical and social figure that is the standard unit of the system’ 
(1986: 15). ‘It remains to be seen’, he adds here, ‘what new and different form (which 
will no longer have to be “biographical”) this machinery heralds, or is preparing for 
us’ (ibid.: 15).  One picks up the sense from Autobiography as well that its object is so 
unprecedented that Passerini demands an entirely new disciplinary vantage point, at 
present unknown, adequate to the forms of experiencing and relating which belong to 
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subjectivity; and adequate to 1968: ‘individuals are moulded who did not exist before’ 
(1996[1988]: 149). At a beautiful moment which introduces the final historical 
chapter on ‘Paths of Individuation’, Passerini remarks: ‘Now it is necessary to 
develop, in the form of voluntary assent something that had been  – despite the 
continuities and the preparations – a spontaneous rupture, the insurgency of a 
subjectivity still lacking subjects’ (ibid.: 125). This sentence – with its complex 
shifting tense – ostensibly refers to the moment at which 1968 was forced to translate 
its explosive utopian potential, its suspension of social life, back into historical time 
and conventional organisational forms. The ‘now’ refers to that moment then. But her 
invocation of the present tense here – her identification with it, even – also evokes the 
suspended form of Autobiography itself, which turns to the psychoanalyst precisely in 
order to throw the case open. The case of an insurgent subjectivity still awaiting its 
subject. 
 
Looking back on Autobiography from the vantage of 2012, Passerini related her 
methods to the 1968 slogan ‘imagination au pouvoir’, meaning: ‘challenging power in 
a radical way by inventing new forms of communication and intersubjectivity, which 
allowed new relationships between subjects, and within the subject itself, to be 
imagined and put into practice’ (2012: 315). As Passerini went on to articulate her 
goals in further projects across the 1990s and 2000s – particularly through studies on 
the nature of European identity and European memory – she found other ways to 
address this methodological aporia: as a commitment to pluralism, intersectionality, 
multiplicities of subjects and histories, and a relinquishing of disciplinary mastery. In 
a book on the idea of Europe, edited by Anthony Pagden, she writes of ‘being aware 
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of the foundational character of intersubjectivity as a horizon for new identities’ and 
expresses the hope that ‘these futures will be identities of irony’ (2002: 208). 
 
The very post-Kantian lesson Passerini offers – as do many of the other examples of 
hybrid and transformational psychoanalytic autobiographies I’ve cited – might be that 
in giving a historical account of subjective life it’s not enough to tell the history of 
cases, because these, confined within their professional limits, are always outstripped 
by the changing versions of ‘being a subject’ they are trying to map. What the case 
might provide, from this more radical perspective, is rather a platform from which to 
pose uncontainable questions and to present uncontainable objects. The extensive 
object, in Passerini’s case, is whatever is mediated by her researches, her 
recollections, and her own analysis – all of which in turn arise out of the broader 
histories to which individuals remain structurally, if elusively, tied.  
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